When the 2nd instance of bail-in language being implemented was discovered in New Zealand, we correctly stated that a major policy shift had been undertaken by the Western world’s central banksters, and that the use of depositor funds to cover future bank losses and failures would occur throughout the rest of the Eurozone and likely the US.
Even we never suspected however that Western Central banksters would be brazen enough to attempt to literally confiscate depositor funds in order to ensure their own salaries and bonuses.
If last week’s speech (& subsequently published by the BIS) given by the Governor of the Bank of Finland and Chairman of the High-level Expert Group on the structure of the EU banking sector is any indication, using depositor funds to guarantee their own salaries is exactly what Western banksters have in mind…
Bail-in lies at the core of tackling the “too-big-to-fail” problem as it improves the loss absorbency of banks, ensures that investors rather than taxpayers take on the responsibility for losses in the face of resolution, and further enhances creditors’ incentives to monitor banks. In the High-level Expert Group we foresaw a two tier system for the bailing in of investors in bank debt. The bail-in process which is outlined by the Commission in the proposed Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive plays a key role in ensuring orderly restructuring or winding-up of banks without the prolonged bankruptcy proceedings.We proposed that there would be an additional layer of designated bail-in instruments to further improve the loss-absorption capacity of banks. We believed that this would best combine loss absorbency and market discipline with legal certainty and the stability of markets. The designated bail-in instruments would have clear pre-specified terms and holding restrictions, which would prevent other banks from holding these debt instruments.In addition, we proposed that the governance and control of banks ought to be strengthened further. Particular attention ought to be given to the ability of management and boards to run large and complex banks, the powers of the risk management function and the quality, comparability and transparency of risk disclosure, the possibility to use designated bail-in instruments in remuneration schemes, and the appropriateness of imposing caps on variable as well as overall compensation.